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L ocke tells us that the project of his Essay arose out of discussions on a topicthat was very remote from the main topic of the Essay, and later historiogra-
phy tells us that remote topic was moral philosophy. Supposedly, then, the Essay
seeks to clear away the underbrush that prevents us from having a clear under-
standing of moral philosophy. The Essay, however, as Antonia LoLordo teaches
us in her new book, Locke’s Moral Man, throws up a very formidable difficulty
for that discussion of moral philosophy that had not really been faced before: the
Essay breaks down the natural kinds distinction by which humans as moral crea-
tures had been traditionally differentiated from other members of the animal
kingdom which are not moral creatures. In spite of this breakdown, however,
Locke insists on a clean line dividing moral agents from other types of being. His
trifecta of features for the moral agent, liberty, personhood, and rationality, be-
comes the topical focus for the central chapters of LoLordo’s book.
This slender little book is an outstanding scholarly foray into the Lockean
prerequisites of moral agency. LoLordo describes her book as “an account of the
Lockean metaphysics of moral agency” (134). She later softens this description
into a Lockean critique of metaphysics, but the first description is more apt. Each
movement takes the reader into the thickets of scholarly debate about the meta-
physical issues surrounding the three central Lockean features of moral agency.
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Before advancing to the main concerns, LoLordo gives introductory consider-
ation to a pair of preliminary matters: corporeality and natural law. Corporeality
is actually identified by Locke as a fourth feature of moral personality, but since
it is mentioned only once by Locke while the other three are referred to again and
again, LoLordo assigns it a lower order of importance in the Essay and feels com-
fortable in giving corporeality only brief consideration.
More has to be said, though, about Locke’s understanding of natural law.
Locke is thought by Schneewind to be the last important voice of the natural law
tradition in modernity, and in the Second Treatise, Locke clearly invokes the nat-
ural law framework for his political philosophy. LoLordo systematically treats of
the central issues: the relation of natural law to divine will, natural law and innate
ideas, motivation to abide natural law, and the nature of obligation under natural
law. She treats these issues fairly, but in the end dismisses further investigation
in favor of the question of what kind of being is obligated under natural law. This
question, of course, leads her back to the investigation into the identified features
of Locke’s moral man.
LoLordo’s concentration on the metaphysics of Locke’s moral man leaves
undeveloped an important consideration. The natural law tradition to which
Locke belongs takes very seriously the topic of moral persons in association.
This is a preeminent concern for the main voices of the tradition from Suarez
through Pufendorf. It would seem, then, that Locke’s affiliation with the tradition
would mandate that his moral man not be considered in metaphysical isolation,
but rather that consideration must be given to the capacities that suit a moral man
for the association that provides the necessity of morality in the first place. We
need to know, for instance, if the association of moral persons is different in kind
from the association of gregarious animals, or if it is a function of reason, and if
so, how this is possible. LoLordo leaves all of these issues unaddressed before
turning to her focus features of liberty, personality, and rationality.
The discussion of liberty begins with LoLordo formalizing Locke’s concep-
tion of Liberty as: “S acts freely in performing action a iff (i) S does a because
S wills to do a, and (ii) if S had not willed to do a, S would not have done a.” I
don’t think that this formalization manages to cover all and only cases of the rela-
tion between S’s willing to do a and S’s doing a. While it covers the cases as free
in which S either wills to do a and does a, or does not will to do a and does not
do a, and it covers as unfree the case in which S does not will to do a and does
a, it fails to cover the case in which S wills to do a, and does not do a. This is a
relatively minor point, but it may have relevance to her later claim that genuine
freedom involves suspension.
After considering active powers and arriving at the conclusion that all and
only spirits have them, she resumes her treatment of liberty. She informs us that
the idea of freedom defined in terms of active powers cannot be the criterion
of moral agency because while animals have active powers, they are not moral
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agents. The real idea buried deep in the chapter is that the form of freedom that
makes up a constituent part of moral agency is the capacity to suspend and delib-
erate. Animals do not have this capacity, but having it allows us to be responsive
to natural law, understood as right reason. LoLordo, then, has connected freedom
properly understood to rationality, but before she can address the second half of
this relation, she must first attend to the idea of personality.
LoLordo opens her discussion of personhood with an appropriation interpre-
tation of Locke on consciousness, but I am not sure that she manages to evade the
Reid objection to Locke on this point. While the appropriation interpretation is
not particularly novel, the most poignantly interesting claim of LoLordo’s whole
book is that the Lockean idea of personality is not a complex idea of a substance,
but rather a complex mixed mode idea. I am nearly persuaded that her position
carries, but her demonstration is slightly but importantly incomplete. There is a
noticeable gap in her argument that she needs to rectify. Her basic argumenta-
tive strategy is eliminative, but she has failed to give sufficient attention to one
of the disjuncts of the Lockean premise. That premise is that “anything that is not
a substance, relation, or quality is a mode,” (75) and she wants to conclude by
elimination from this premise that persons are modes. This conclusion, however,
requires a little more work than she gives it.
She deals very handily with qualities. While simple ideas represent qualities,
the idea of a person is complex idea. This is decisive. That leaves a troika of pos-
sibilities for the complex idea of a person: it is either a relation, or a mode, or
a substance. LoLordo fairly annihilates the possibility that the idea of a person
represents a substance. This is the thrust of her main energy, and she has a bar-
rage of arguments to support her position. It must be said that she is following
the Locke literature here, and the substance interpretation of persons is seen as
her main rival to the mixed modes interpretation of persons, but she treats the
substance interpretation as the only real contender to mixed modes interpretation.
This concentration on substance, however, leaves uneliminated the possibility
that a complex idea of a person might be a relation. All that I can find her say-
ing about relations in the body of the argumant is “Persons, organisms, and souls
cannot be qualities or relations, so they must be either substances or modes” (92).
For some reason she has coupled relations together with qualities. To be sure, she
has won the day with respect to qualities, but she did so by arguing singularly for
that elimination. There is no separate argument for eliminating relations; this is a
bare assertion, perhaps founded on an intuition. She does consider relations in her
next chapter on rationality, but it is not clear if and how this treatment hearkens
back to the eliminative argument for persons as modes.
This defect in the argument is not merely a matter of logical tidiness, although
it is at least that. There are reasons that we should give consideration to this
possibility of the idea of persons as relations, including the possibility that a rela-
tional interpretation of persons might include many of the same advantages that
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LoLordo accredits to the modal interpretation such as being consistent with anti-
essentialism, and that there are living philosophical interpretations of persons as
relations, for example in Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont.
There are two promising approaches to evading this difficulty. First, Locke
insists that relations are always comparative, but it might be shown that the idea
of a person does not itself bring to mind the idea of comparison. As it sits, this
is not a knockout argument. Someone who thought that the idea of a person as a
relation might object that there is no necessity that a relational idea plainly con-
tains a readily visible comparative idea. This, however, is an objection to Locke
rather than to LoLordo, and if we do dismiss the comparative element of rela-
tional ideas, it very well could follow that the concept of relations collapses into
the concept of mixed modes. If that were the case then LoLordo’s argument goes
through in spite of the objection.
Second, mixed modes combine simple and complex ideas into a unified idea.
The idea of a person, we might think, is just such an ideal unity. Relations, on the
other hand, and this may be an aspect of the comparative feature, always keep dis-
tinct the ideas that are related. Thus, the idea of a person is not a relation. This
argument, too, would need further specification and support. It might be argued that
Locke’s own idea of personal identity maintains a relation between distinct ideas of
a person at different times but that the idea of a person now contains the idea of a
person at some previous time. In fact it might seem that in order for Locke’s notion
of a person to overcome the Reid objection that relations must be left evident on the
surface. In any case, it would appear that there is still some additional work to be
accomplished before LoLordo’s eliminative argument is complete.
LoLordo’s last full chapter deals with rationality. In Essay 4.17.2, Locke asks
the very pertinent question, “What need is there for reason?” LoLordo has an an-
swer to this question that is intended to tie her whole project together. Indeed, the
concepts she has worked so hard to distinguish bleed into each other when placed
alongside rationality. Moral agency requires rationality, according to LoLordo,
for a number of reasons. First, rationality involves a capacity for abstraction.
While animals are capable on Locke’s account of some level of reasoning, they
are wholly incapable of abstraction. LoLordo argues that Locke includes in ani-
mal reasoning the capacity for making inferences, and, again, since animals are
not moral agents, inferential capacity cannot then be an essential characteristic
of moral personhood and agency. Abstraction, on the other hand, is an aspect of
reason that according to Locke, “is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt
Man and Brutes” (Essay 2.11.10), and LoLordo explains why it is necessary for
moral agency. The agent must be able to know and abide natural law, but knowl-
edge of the principles of natural law itself requires the capacity for general ideas.
Moreover, in order to know the natural law as law, one must know that it pro-
mulgates from a legitimate authority. In the case of natural law, that authority is
God. God’s existence can be demonstrated to all and only thinking beings that
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have a capacity for abstraction. Thus, rationality as abstraction makes it possible
to know the natural law.
Second, rationality also includes the capacity through reflection of forming a
lasting conception of self. This means, according to LoLordo, that the person mo-
tivated by ideas of pleasures and pains, understands that future pleasures and pains
as consequences of abiding or violating the natural law will adhere to the very same
person experiencing present pleasures and pains. Thus, rationality satisfies the re-
quirement for moral agents to be able to supply a reason for their actions.
Third, rationality gives agents a capacity for first suspending action motivated
by present desire, and second for deliberating on the outcomes of that action.
Thus, rationality provides the groundwork of freedom, defined in terms of sus-
pension and deliberation, and freedom is a necessary constituent of Lockean
personhood and agency.
While I find myself in general agreement with this interesting interpretation
of Locke on the role of rationality for moral agency, I think that LoLordo perhaps
wrongly, and certainly too quickly, dismisses the inferential role of reason in
Locke’s moral project. One thing that she does not mention in the chapter on ra-
tionality that she has brought up several times in earlier sections is that Locke
holds morality to be a demonstrative science. Locke illustrates this with a demon-
stration that where there is no property there is no injustice, a proposition of
which, Locke assures us, we can be just as certain as we can that a triangle
has three angles equal to two right ones (Essay 4.3.18). Yet in a footnote (110),
LoLordo indicates that while animals may not be capable of probable reason-
ing, they are capable of demonstrative reasoning, but, of course, this is just what
is required for a demonstrative science. LoLordo defends Locke against Leib-
niz’s objection that animals cannot reason because all reasoning relies on general
principles. In response to Leibniz, she brings forward Locke saying that, “the im-
mediate Object of all our Reasoning and Knowledge, is nothing but Particulars,”
(110). This allows animals inferential capacity without attributing to them gen-
eral concepts or ideas. The passage here, however, is not about animal reasoning,
but about human reasoning, and the claim is that all reasoning is particular. One
page later, LoLordo again brings us Locke saying that animals have reason, “but
it is only in particular Ideas,” (111). Yet, if we are to believe the passage that she
has presented one page earlier, humans suffer from exactly this same weakness.
This needs to be cleared up, and one natural possibility is that humans have an
inferential capacity involving general ideas, and animals lack this capacity.
The objections I have presented here aside, Antonia LoLordo’s book is excel-
lent, and is worthy of careful consideration. It should be hoped that LoLordo will
return often to us with insightful interpretations of Locke and perhaps other fig-
ures of early modernity. Her scholarship is exemplary, but figures like Locke are
only kept alive by turning to them our imaginations as well as our intellects. It is
clear that LoLordo is apt at opening interesting new avenues of interpretation.
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